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Abstract Evolutionary epistemology can provide a uni-
fied scientific methodology that enables scholars to study
the evolution of life as well as the evolution of cognition,
science, culture and any other phenomenon displayed by
living organisms. In this article, three heuristics are pro-
vided that allow for a thorough search for the units, levels
and mechanisms of evolution. Contrary to previous
approaches, units, levels and mechanisms are not identified
by pointing out essential features, but rather ostensive
definitions are preferred. That is, units are considered as
such if a level of evolution and a mechanism of evolution is
identifiable. Levels are levels if one can point out units that
evolve at that level according to evolutionary mechanisms,
and mechanisms are considered as such if one can point out
units and levels where the mechanism is active.
Keywords Evolutionary epistemology  Units 
Levels  Evolutionary mechanisms
Introduction
Evolutionary epistemology is a branch of naturalized phi-
losophy that originally endorsed the view that both the
study of knowledge as a phenomenon as well as the
acquirement of knowledge as a scientific activity need to be
conducted from within evolutionary theory.
Through the years, the basic tenet (that cognition needs
to be studied from within evolutionary theory) has been
expanded to include the idea that all behaviours portrayed
by living organisms (culture, language, memory, vision,
etc.) can be regarded as cognitive processes and that all,
therefore, need to be examined in light of evolutionary
theory.
In this article, we will argue that evolutionary episte-
mology can actually provide a unified scientific method-
ology that enables scholars to study the evolution of life as
well as the evolution of cognition, science, culture and any
other phenomenon displayed by living organisms.
In order to make this view clear, in what follows, the
origin of the field of evolutionary epistemology is sketched,
and how evolutionary epistemology relates to the units and
levels of selection debate is demonstrated. Second, a more
thorough analysis of the units and levels of selection debate is
given. Scholars working within both the units and levels of
selection debate as well as within evolutionary epistemology
have been developing heuristics based on the theory of
evolution by means of natural selection to study the evolu-
tion of a variety of biological and (traditionally understood to
be) extra-biological phenomena such as cognition and
culture. As will be demonstrated, in their search for these
heuristics, they have actually been developing methodolo-
gies, research tools that allow us to study these phenomena.
So far, the heuristics provided have been strongly biased
towards the theory of evolution by means of natural
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selection. In this article, we will demonstrate how heuris-
tics can be developed to allow for the inclusion of other
evolutionary theories as well.
Evolutionary epistemology
Evolutionary epistemology is a concept that was first laun-
ched by the psychologist Campbell (1974). Intrigued by
cognition in general, and in particular with the process of
knowledge acquisition in humans as well as in other ani-
mals, Campbell (1959, pp. 153–155) wanted to build an
‘empirical science of induction’, as he called it. More spe-
cifically, he wanted to study epistemology (i.e. the philo-
sophical discipline that studies how we come to know) from
within evolutionary biology rather than regard it as a distinct
branch of philosophy.
In practice, Campbell achieved this goal by pursuing
two different goals:
(1) He investigated the different cognitive mechanisms
that organisms can portray as outcomes of biological
evolution (e.g. how learning by imitation or the
ability to have mental representations evolved by
means of natural selection).
(2) He investigated how it was possible to apply natural
selection not only within the domain of life’s
evolution, but also within the cognitive, epistemolog-
ical realm.
The first effort would especially find hearsay in natural-
ized philosophy where the search for biological foundations
of cognition became a widely pursued goal (Gontier 2006).
In 1941, Konrad Lorenz already argued that Kant’s synthetic
a priori claims could, in light of evolution, be reformulated
as claims that are ontogenetically a priori and phylogeneti-
cally a posteriori. Imprinting or fixed action patterns are to a
great extent innate behaviours of individuals but were
argued to be somehow acquired throughout the evolution of
the species. These ideas were later independently formu-
lated by Campbell as well, to explain why animals appear to
have some instinctive knowledge of the world in which they
are born prior to experiencing it. In 1963, Karl Popper
independently arrived to his evolutionary biology-inspired
theory that science progresses along the lines of conjectures
(trials) and refutations (errors). In his book entitled Objec-
tive Knowledge, he too would use the term evolutionary
epistemology (Popper 1975, p. 67). Toulmin (1972) would
argue that science can be regarded as a selective process;
and Skinner (1981, 1986), the founding father of
behaviourism or instructionism as it is nowadays sometimes
called, assessed that trial and error learning or operant
conditioning are similar to selectionist processes. Eventu-
ally, all these events would inspire Bradie (1986) to
distinguish between two programs: the evolutionary epis-
temology of cognitive mechanisms (EEM) and the evolu-
tionary epistemology of scientific theories (EET). The
normative EEM program studied cognition as an outcome of
evolution by means of natural selection; it is the ‘…attempt
to extend evolutionary theory to the explanation of the
development of cognitive structures…’ (Bradie 1986, p.
403). The other, descriptive EET program studied science
and the question of scientific progress by analogy to selec-
tionist processes; it is ‘the attempt to analyze the growth of
knowledge using evolutionary models, drawn from biol-
ogy…’ (Bradie 1986, p. 403).
It is especially the second point that Campbell made,
which is of interest for the purpose of this article. His
investigation of how exactly it is possible to apply natural
selection not only to the evolution of life but also to the
products of life’s evolution—which is a question of how
natural selection operates—would find hearsay in both
biology and philosophy of biology. More specifically, his
examination of how exactly it is that natural selection
operates run juxtaposed with the units and levels of
selection debate.
Any attempt to understand how selection operates and
how it can be expanded to include non-biological phe-
nomena is ultimately a quest of specifying where, at what
levels it operates, and on what units. The Modern Synthesis
straightforwardly argues that evolution by means of natural
selection takes place at the interface between a phenotype
and the environment; it does not make statements on how
to apply natural selection to phenomena such as the evo-
lution of cognition, creative thinking, science or culture.
In order to overcome this obstacle, Campbell (1959)
abstracted a template from natural selection which he first
dubbed ‘blind variation and selective survival’ and later
reformulated into ‘blind variation and selective retention’
(Campbell 1960). This template can be regarded as a for-
mula with heuristic potential: regardless of the phenome-
non under study, if we can understand that phenomenon to
vary blindly and be selectively retained, then this phe-
nomenon evolves by means of natural selection (i.e. it is a
unit of selection), and, importantly, this phenomenon also
operates as a selective process.
The abstraction of a template (of the operation) of natural
selection to be able to apply it to other domains besides the
evolution of life was also independently achieved by
Lewontin (1970). He argued that it was possible to abstract a
‘logical skeleton’ of natural selection that is a ‘powerful
predictive system for changes at all levels of biological
organisation’. The skeleton consists of the following ‘three
principles’: ‘1. Different individuals in a population have
different morphologies, physiologies, and behaviours
(phenotypic variation). 2. Different phenotypes have
different rates of survival and reproduction in different
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environments (differential fitness). 3. There is a correlation
between parents and offspring in the contribution of each to
future generations (fitness is heritable). These three princi-
ples embody the principle of evolution by natural selection’
(Lewontin 1970, p. 1).
Formulas that provide us with heuristic information of
how natural selection operates were later also formulated
by Hull (1980, 1981; Hull et al. 2001) who introduced
the ‘replication, variation and environmental interaction’
scheme; and Plotkin (1994) who argued for a ‘generate,
test, regenerate’ formula that focussed on the ‘replicator,
interactor and the lineage’.
These schemes not merely inform us on the operation of
natural selection (how it works), they also inform us on the
nature of the units of selection and the levels at which
selection operates (what they are). It is exactly because of
this that there is a strong interrelation with the terminology
put forward by scholars who tried to untangle the units and
levels of selection and those that wanted to provide heu-
ristics of the operation of natural selection.
A closer look at the units and levels of selection debate
The debate over the units and levels of selection started in
biology with the introduction of Wynne-Edwards’ (1962)
book on group selection. The main point of discussion
revolved around whether or not the fact that a group
sometimes benefits from the presence of certain traits in the
individuals that make up the group (e.g. altruistic or self-
sacrificing behaviour) can actually account for the positive
selection of these traits, even though these traits can have
negative effects on the fitness of the individuals that posses
them. Wynne-Edwards claimed that certain traits might
indeed be for the good of the group (i.e. contribute to the
overall fitness of the group) even though it disregards the
individual’s fitness or even if the trait is maladaptive to
the individual.
Williams (1966) strongly opposed such a view, arguing
on the contrary that only the gene can be the ultimate ben-
eficiary of selection. Even though it might appear that
groups benefit from the positive selection of some traits over
others, that selection process can always be explained by
and reduced to the gene. Following Williams, Richard
Dawkins would further argue that for something to be
considered a unit of selection, it must be a replicator, i.e. ‘an
entity in the universe of which copies are made’ (Dawkins
1982, p. 162), and this replicator must posses longevity,
fecundity and copying-fidelity (Dawkins 1976, p. 19). The
rationale behind these requirements was ‘that an entity must
have a low rate of spontaneous, endogenous change, if the
selective advantage of its phenotypic effects over those of
rival (‘allelic’) entities is to have any significant effect’
(Dawkins 1982, p. 164). He would conclude that only genes,
and perhaps memes, can fulfil these properties and that,
therefore, they are the true and exclusive units of selection.
Individuals or groups are but ‘clouds in the sky’ or ‘dust-
storms in the desert’ (Dawkins 1999, pp. 99–100) because
they lack the stability and integrity required for copying.
Rather than understanding organisms or phenotypes as the
unit of selection, as was subscribed to by Mayr and other
founders of the Modern Synthesis, Dawkins (1983) reduced
the role of the organism and of populations to mere vehicles
that house the true units of selection. Dawkins (1982, p. 162)
states: ‘…[t]here are two ways in which we can characterize
natural selection. Both are correct: they simply focus on
different aspects of the same process. Evolution results from
the differential survival of replicators. Genes are replicators;
organisms and groups of organisms are not replicators, they
are vehicles in which replicators travel about. Vehicle
selection is the process by which some vehicles are more
successful than other vehicles in ensuring the survival of
their replicators’.
In his Extended phenotype, Dawkins (1999, p. 114)
would further argue that there is a nested hierarchy of
levels at which selection takes place, but every time, this
selection process can be reduced to and explained by the
selection of replicators.
Especially Dawkins’ definition of a unit of selection
triggered great controversy over how exactly a unit of
selection can be defined; it was at this point in time that
philosophers of evolutionary biology in general, and evo-
lutionary epistemologists in specific entered the debate.
They started analysing the conceptual issues over units of
selection, and they have been doing so ever since.
To start with, Hull (1980, 1981) argued that the ‘vehicle
selection’ that Dawkins was talking about might be better
understood as the selection of ‘interactors’; interactors
being any ‘entity that directly interacts in a cohesive whole
with its environment in such a way that replication is
differential’ (Hull 1980, p. 318). ‘‘When Dawkins defines
‘replicator’, he has replicators interacting with their envi-
ronment in two ways—to produce copies of them and to
influence their own survival and the survival of their cop-
ies. Just as Dawkins coined the term ‘replicator’ for the
entities that function in the first process, I have suggested
‘interactor’ for the entities that function in the second
process’’ (Hull 1980, p. 318).
Following this characterization, Hull (1980, p. 318)
could abstract his own logical skeleton of selection, and he
defined selection as ‘a process in which the differential
extinction and proliferation of interactors cause the dif-
ferential perpetuation of the replicators that produced
them’.
Hull (1980, pp. 320–327) further emphasized that this
characterization of the selection process makes it clear that
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there are different levels of selection: levels where repli-
cation occurs (he pointed out the genetic and organismal
level), and levels where interaction occurs that results in
differential replication (an example that he gave was
populations).
Wimsatt (1981, p. 124) would also criticize Williams
and Dawkins’ claim that selection at any level can and
must always be reduced to gene selection because only this
entity is stable and hereditary. Wimsatt (1981, p. 127)
would, on the contrary, argue in favour of ‘higher-level
biological units of selection’ that can fulfil the ‘structural
requirements’ of being hereditary, portraying variance in
comparison to other such units, and, therefore, having
differential fitness values (Wimsatt 1981, pp. 165–166). He
would subsequently define units based upon this variance
in fitness they can portray at a certain level. More specif-
ically, a unit of selection is: ‘…any entity for which there is
heritable context-independent variance in fitness among
entities at that level which does not appear as heritable
context-independent variance in fitness (and thus, for
which the variance in fitness is context-dependent) at any
lower level of organization’ (Wimsatt 1981, p. 144).
The fact that this definition of a unit of selection again is
interrelated with the definition of a level would make
Brandon (1982) call for a separate study of levels of
selection. Following Wimsatt, Brandon would also define
levels in close relation to fitness and adaptedness (Brandon
1982, p. 315). Brandon would furthermore define natural
selection as ‘…the differential reproduction of biological
entities which is due to the differential adaptedness of those
entities to a common environment’ (Brandon 1982, p. 318).
In the years to come, the replicator–interactor dichot-
omy would by and large set the stage for all theorizing on
the units and levels of natural selection, and these concepts
have indeed allowed for the identification of a large num-
ber of units and levels. Nonetheless, from the second half
of the 1980s onwards, scholars would begin to see the flaws
inherent to this dichotomy. Genic pluralists, as they would
call themselves (Kitcher et al. 1990, pp. 159–160; Sterelny
and Kitcher 1988; Waters 1991, p. 555), would criticize
Dawkins’ and Williams’ move to reduce selection to the
level of the gene. They argue instead that the gene itself
can be the target of selection at many different levels of
biological organisation. As such, genes are considered to
be interactors (Lloyd 2005, 3.4). On the other hand,
developmental systems theorists (Griffiths and Gray 1994,
pp. 292–295; 1997; Oyama et al. 2001) would argue that
whole developmental systems (e.g. the hormone system or
the vascular system) or even life cycles can be considered
as units of selection even though they are not replicated
from one generation to the next. Moreover, developmental
systems theories and genic pluralism provide opposing
views because the former argue that selection is possible at
a number of different entities even though they are not
replicated from one generation to the next, while genic
pluralists argue that only the gene is the target of selection,
albeit at many levels (for a discussion see Sterelny et al.
1996).
Griesemer (2000) would try and combine these oppos-
ing ideas by introducing the notion of a ‘reproducer’ as the
unit of selection. Although systems are not replicated,
Griesemer argues that such systems are somehow repro-
duced form one generation to the next and as such these
‘reproducers’ can be considered as units of selection. More
specifically; ‘Populations of reproducers have the capacity
to evolve, insofar as the pieces of development that realize
their reproductive capacities themselves have heritable
properties that vary. For reproducers at a given level to be
units of evolution, their developmental component parts
must also be reproducers’ (Griesemer 2000, p. 363).
Griesemer further argues that reproducers can account
for and integrate replicators: ‘Replication is inheritance
with coding mechanisms of development. Inheritance is
reproduction with evolved mechanisms of development.
Since replication processes are reproduction processes,
they must also satisfy the material overlap requirement for
reproduction’ (Griesemer 2000, p. 366).
In sum, rather than choosing between replicators or in-
teractors as the true units of selection, today scholars are
arguing more and more in favour of unit pluralism.
Moreover, they are also coming to terms with level plu-
ralism, that is, they are investigating what exactly the
consequences are of accepting multilevel selection (May-
nard Smith and Szatzmáry 1995; Okasha 2005; Vrba and
Eldredge 1984).
Moving beyond selectionist inspired approaches
for identifying units and levels
So far, units and levels have always been defined from
within the theory of evolution by means of natural selection.
That is, until now it has always been taken for granted that
natural selection is the evolutionary mechanism according
to which units evolve at certain levels. Depending on how
natural selection is defined or argued to operate, scholars
have argued that for something to be a unit of selection, this
unit must portray (additive) variation; be transmittable
(heritable, replicatable or reproducible); demonstrate
(emergent) adaptation or the capacity to adapt; have dif-
ferential fitness values (that are in turn heritable or trans-
mittable); etc. (Dawkins 1976; Lewontin 1970; Griesemer
2000; Sober 1984, p. 204; Vrba 1989; Eldredge 1985; Vrba
and Gould 1986; Wimsatt 1980).
In other words, the criteria used to include or exclude
something from being a level or a unit is theory-dependent
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if not biased towards the theory of evolution by means of
natural selection.
Moreover, the above-listed criteria that units or levels
must fulfil to be considered as such are in a real sense
comprehended to be inherent, if not intrinsic properties of
these units and levels. It is, therefore, not at all surprising
that Hull (1980, 1981) characterized the quest for units and
levels as a metaphysical endeavour (and see also Kitcher
et al. 1990, p. 159).
Current evolutionary biology, however, is making it clear
that we need to try and move beyond the metaphysical issues
as well as allow for the inclusion of evolutionary theories
other than natural selection in regard to the identification of
levels and units: We need to do so for the following two
reasons. For one, natural selection, although an important
evolutionary mechanism, is not the exclusive mechanism
according to which life or the products of life evolve.
Indeed, a number of complementary and alternative evolu-
tionary mechanisms have been identified such as symbio-
genesis, hybridization, niche construction, drift, the ratchet
effect, Baldwin effect,1 etc. Stated otherwise, adhering to an
evolutionary view makes it necessary to endorse that if a
certain natural phenomenon is unexplainable by natural
selection, then the alternative can only be that it has to be
explainable by another evolutionary mechanism. It simply
cannot be that it did not evolve just because it did not evolve
by means of natural selection. Secondly, and following from
the previous point, units and levels can and must be iden-
tifiable without making use of the theory of evolution by
means of natural selection. That is, evolutionary mecha-
nisms are always active on some units at certain levels, even
though the latter are not replicators or interactors. It is,
therefore, better to endorse a more neutral approach and
move from the units and levels of selection debate to the
units and levels of evolution debate.
In this regard, scholars working within the field of
symbiogenesis have already put forward the symbiome
(Sapp 2004, p. 1047) and symbiont (Gontier 2007, pp. 174–175)
as units of evolution—and the following logical skeleton of
symbiogenesis has already been abstracted: ‘Universal
symbiogenesis is the process whereby new entities are
introduced because of the interactions between (different)
previously independently existing entities. These interac-
tions encompass horizontal mergings and the new entities
that emerge because of this are called symbionts. The
process is irreversible and discontinuous’ (Gontier 2007,
pp. 174–175).
In other words, the time has come to not only recognize
unit pluralism, and multilevel selection, but we need also to
accept the consequences of mechanism pluralism and the
fact that this introduces units and levels of evolution that do
not necessarily have the intrinsic properties demanded of
replicators, interactors, reproducers, etc.
In what follows, a pragmatic and extensional way to
identify units and levels of evolution as well as evolutionary
mechanisms is, therefore, favoured over a metaphysical one.
Heuristics to respectively study units, levels
and mechanisms of evolution
Given that there is such a thing as evolution, one needs to
specify the units, levels and evolutionary mechanisms by
which this evolution occurs. This can be done by following
the heuristics set out in Tables 1, 2 and 3.
General remarks on the heuristics
It should be noted from the beginning that it is not regarded
as meaningful to a priori speculate upon what evolution
itself is, what is essential to it, or what form any one of its
units, levels and evolutionary mechanisms can take on. No
(essential) definitions are provided. Rather, units, levels
and evolutionary mechanisms are defined extensional.
More specifically, in the heuristics it is investigated
whether features, traits, events, elements, etc. that are
assumed2 to be relevant for evolution (from now on desig-
nated as x), are a unit, level or evolutionary mechanism that
is indeed involved in evolution. If it can be demonstrated
that x is at minimum one of the latter three (a unit, level or
mechanism), then x is a part of (an extension of) evolution.
What form a unit of evolution takes on, what relates all
units or what characterizes all units is not defined before-
hand. Rather, an x (an element, trait, etc.) that is assumed to
be a unit of evolution, is recognized as such if and only if at
least one level can be pointed out where x is a unit, and at
least one evolutionary mechanism can be pointed out to
which x is subjected. A unit of evolution can only be a unit if
it evolves at a certain level; if it evolves at a certain level, it
is subjected to a certain evolutionary mechanism. Thus, it
cannot be the case that an element is shown to evolve,
without this evolution taking place at a certain level. Or it
cannot be shown that a unit is present at a certain level,
without it being subjected to a certain evolutionary mech-
anism at that level.
The extensional definition of a unit of evolution, there-
fore, is that which evolves at a certain evolution level and
1 The Baldwin and ratchet effect can to a certain extent be
comprehended from within selectionist approaches, yet certain
aspects of these mechanisms extend and complement mere selec-
tionist views. 2 Either intuitively or experimentally.
Theory Biosci. (2010) 129:167–182 171
123
is subjected to a certain evolutionary mechanism is a unit
of evolution.
Whether x (a space, feature, trait, event, element, etc.) is
recognized as a level of evolution depends on whether it is
possible to identify at least one unit of evolution that is
subjected to minimally one evolutionary mechanism at this
level, and at least one evolutionary mechanism needs to be
active at the level (not on the level). The latter (that at least
Table 1 Is x (a feature, trait, space, event, element, etc., that is presumed relevant for evolution) a unit in/of evolution? (read from left to right
and top-down)
? Try to prove that it is a unit of evolution (1 example suffices). Thus go to yes
Y
E
S
Where? At which 
level is x the subject of 
evolution
Not one level found? X is not a unit, go to no
One/multiple level(s)? 
Identify them all. (Justifies 
that x is a unit.) 
Via which evolutionary 
mechanism(s)? Identify 
them all 
Since when? When did x first originate in time and when did it become a 
unit of evolution? 
How does this unit x 
interact with other 
units?  
Can this unit be divided into one or several subunits?
If so, then are they also units in evolution? 
Can this unit be absorbed into one or several superunits? If 
so, then are they also units in evolution? 
Can this unit also be 
regarded as a level
and/or mechanism of 
evolution? 
? & yes: try and treat the unit as a level and/or a 
mechanism, thus go to level and/or mechanism
Relevance? Is the unit x sufficient and/or necessary for evolution? 
N
O
Level and/or 
mechanism? 
? or Yes: go to level and/or mechanism
No: treat x as irrelevant for evolution until proven 
otherwise 
Table 2 Is x (a feature, trait, space, event, element, etc., that is presumed relevant for evolution) a level in/of evolution? (read from left to right
and top-down)
? Try to prove that it is a level of evolution (1 example suffices). Thus go to yes
Y
E
S
How many/which units
evolve at this level? 
Not one unit, x is not a level of evolution, go to no
One/multiple unit(s)? Identify them all. (Justifies that x is a 
level.) 
How many 
evolutionary 
mechanisms are active 
at (not on) this level?  
Equals the question: how many evolutionary mechanisms 
are active upon the units that evolve at this level. (testing 
device) 
What is the ontological 
status of the level? 
The level is an abstract notion that facilitates theory 
formation/ an exiting entity
Since when? Locate the origin of x in time or when it becomes necessary 
to invoke x as an abstract notion in the theory of evolution  
How does this level x 
interact with other 
levels?  
Can this level be divided into sublevels? If so, are they also 
levels in evolution? 
Can this level be absorbed into superlevels? If so, are they 
also levels in evolution? 
Can this level also be 
regarded as a unit
and/or mechanism of 
evolution?  
? & yes: try and treat the level as a unit and/or mechanism, 
thus go to unit and/or mechanism
Relevance? Is the level x sufficient and/or necessary for evolution? 
N
O
Unit and/or 
mechanism?
? or Yes: go to unit and/or mechanism
No: treat x as irrelevant for evolution until proven 
otherwise 
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one evolutionary mechanism needs to be active at the
level) is automatically the case if a unit of evolution has
been identified to evolve at x. Thus, that x is a level of
evolution is proven by identifying one unit of evolution that
is subjected to at least one evolutionary mechanism at x.
Regarding evolutionary mechanisms, x is recognized as an
evolutionary mechanism if x at least works on one unit of
evolution, that evolves at a certain level of evolution. Or,
stated more elaborately, x is an evolutionary mechanism
involved in evolution if at least one unit of evolution is
found to be subjected to it, and at least one level of evo-
lution is found where x is active at (not on). But again, the
latter is automatically the case (that one level of evolution
is found where the mechanism is active at), if at least one
unit is found to be subjected to the mechanism, because a
unit is always subjected to a mechanism at a certain level.
This is a circular way of denoting units, levels and
evolutionary mechanisms because it brings the identifica-
tion of units, levels and evolutionary mechanisms into the
system. The identification of anyone involves pointing out,
quite ostensively, the presence of the other two. What units,
levels and mechanisms are is not defined from outside the
system.
Although circular, this is actually a rather strong as well
as neutral and pragmatic way of searching for units, levels
and evolutionary mechanisms. It is strong because all the
three elements need to be identified. It is neutral because it
neither a priori specifies the nature of x, nor the nature of a
unit, level or mechanism. Defining a unit beforehand (as,
e.g. a replicator or an interactor) might set clear boundaries
to what is and what is not a unit, but it might also lead to
the exclusion of a trait even though it is subjected to an
evolutionary mechanism at a certain level of evolution.
Finally, because there are no rigorous definitions given,
the identification of x as a unit does not exclude it to
possibly also be a level or perhaps even a mechanism. The
same also goes for a level and a mechanism.
Walking through the heuristics
Suppose then that we have an x that is presumed to be
relevant for evolution. X is relevant for evolution if and
only if it can be proven to be at minimum either a unit,
level or mechanism of evolution.
In what follows, it is explained how we can know that x
is or is not a unit, level or mechanism.
Table 3 Is x (an evolutionary mechanism, feature, trait, space, event, element, etc., that is presumed relevant for evolution) an evolutionary
mechanism involved in/on evolution? (read from left to right and top-down)
? Try to prove that x is an evolutionary mechanism involved in evolution. Thus go to yes
Y
E
S
On how many units is 
this evolutionary 
mechanism working? 
Not one unit: x is not an evolutionary mechanism involved in 
evolution 
One/miltiple unit(s). Identify them all. (Justifies that x is an 
evolutionary mechanism involved in evolution.) 
At (not on) how many 
levels of evolution is this 
evolutionary mechanism 
active? 
Equals the question: the units that are subjected to this 
evolutionary mechanism, at how many levels are they subjected 
to it? 
How does the mechanism work? Which conditions need to be met in order for the 
evolutionary mechanism to occur? Answer requires (universal) EE formulas of the 
workings of the mechanism 
Since when? Locate in time when these conditions are met regarding each 
unit and each level = when the evolutionary mechanism became 
a mechanism involved in evolution at that unit and/or level 
 How does this 
mechanism x interact
with other mechanisms?  
Can this mechanism be divided into sub-mechanism(s)?
(Depends on the presence of subconditions.) If so, are they also 
mechanisms of evolution? 
Can this mechanism be absorbed into a super-mechanism(s)?
(Depends on the existence of a mechanism that allows to 
combine different mechanisms into one single mechanism.) If 
so, are they also mechanisms of evolution? 
Can this mechanism also 
be regarded as a unit
and/or level of evolution? 
? & yes: try and treat the mechanism as a unit and/or level, thus 
go to unit and/or level
Relevance? Is the mechanism x sufficient and/or necessary for evolution?  
N
O
Unit and/or level?  ? or Yes: go to unit and/or level
No: treat x as irrelevant for evolution until proven otherwise 
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How to examine whether x is a unit of evolution
How do we know that x (e.g. a gene, meme, replicator,
reproducer, symbiont, symbiome, chromosome, phenotype,
trait, behaviour, system, pattern, organism, etc.) is a unit of
evolution (Table 1)?
The question mark phase
If we do not know without examination of x that x is a unit
of evolution, then we can evidently neither exclude it from
being one, nor recognize it as a unit. In such an uncer-
tain situation, the heuristic recommends that we try to
prove that it is a unit of evolution. One example suffices to
demonstrate that it is a unit. It is useless to try and prove
that it is not a unit of evolution (in such an uncertain situ-
ation) for the following reason. If x is not a unit, then the
heuristic says that we need to try and prove whether it is a
level or an evolutionary mechanism. But even if one
identifies x as a level or a mechanism, this will not have
proven that x is not a unit. This is the case because being a
unit does not a priori exclude something from being a
possible level or perhaps even a mechanism.3
How then can we prove that x is a unit? X is a unit of
evolution if it can be proven that x is subjected to a certain
evolutionary mechanism, at a certain level of evolution. If it
is subjected to a mechanism, then a level must be identi-
fiable because a unit always evolves at a certain level.
(An example would be that the organism is a unit of evo-
lution that evolves at the level of the environment by
means of natural selection.)
The first question that, therefore, needs to be raised if
one wants to prove that x is a unit is: where, at which level
is it a unit?
If one or several such levels of evolution are identified
where x is subjected to a certain evolutionary mechanism,
then this proves that x is a unit of evolution. If, on the other
hand, not even one level is found where x is the subject of
evolution, x is not a unit of evolution. In this case, one
should go to no phase.
The yes phase
The yes phase is distinguishable into an identification,
question constraining and generating, and an evaluation
phase.
The identification phase
If one skipped the question mark phase, and immediately
argued that x is a unit of evolution, then such action can
only be justified if again one or several levels are identified
where x is the subject of evolution. In other words, a small
test is built into the heuristic that allows one to demonstrate
that x is indeed a unit of evolution. It furthermore needs to
be identified according to which evolutionary mecha-
nism(s) x evolves at that single or at those multiple levels.
In other words, the heuristic allows for the testing of two
ideas. The first is that there is such as thing as multilevel
evolution (a more commonly held view nowadays, e.g.
Okasha 2005); the second (not so commonly subscribed to
idea) is that there can simultaneously be different evolu-
tionary mechanisms active upon the same unit.
If the unit is subjected to several mechanisms at one
level, then the relation or possible interaction between the
evolutionary mechanisms needs to be explained in regard
to this unit. Furthermore, it needs to be explained how the
same unit can simultaneously be subjected to different
mechanisms at the same level.
If the unit is subjected to the same mechanism at mul-
tiple levels, then it needs to be explained how the same
mechanism can be active on the same unit at all these
levels. If the unit is subjected to different mechanisms at
multiple levels, then it needs to be explained how different
mechanisms can be active on the same unit at different
levels and also the interaction between these mechanisms
in regard to this unit needs to be examined.
Finally, if a unit is the subject of evolution at multiple
levels, then it also needs to be explained how these levels
interact or relate to one another, specifically in regard to
this unit.
The answers to these latter questions will be of an evo-
lutionary epistemological nature. A consequence of the
recognition of several levels is that the same unit can evolve
at several levels. Like Russian dolls, genes, for example, can
be the target of selection at the level of the phenotype
(e.g. regarding their expression) and/or at the level of the
environment (via the phenotype in which they are expres-
sed). The question then becomes how these levels interact in
regard to this unit and how the same unit can be subjected to
the same evolutionary mechanism at several levels.
A consequence of the recognition of several mecha-
nisms is that these can act upon (parts of) the same unit
simultaneously, at the same or different levels. If this is the
case, then it becomes a possibility that the mechanisms
interact with one another, and even if they do not, it needs
to be explained why they do not interact.
The topic of the existence or (im)possibility of interac-
tions between evolutionary mechanisms is by and large
neglected in the evolutionary epistemological literature. It is
3 That a unit of evolution might also be a mechanism of evolution
sounds strange, but given the multiplicity of the evolutionary
mechanisms that exist, and given the fact that we do not know what
a unit can be, this, nevertheless, needs to be a possibility that is taken
into consideration.
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mostly implicitly assumed that if one evolutionary mecha-
nism is active, then all other evolutionary mechanisms are
not. It is counterintuitive to ask whether an evolutionary
mechanism itself can be subjected to other evolutionary
mechanisms (e.g. can natural selection be subjected to
symbiogenesis; or can symbiogenesis be the target of
selection?), and it is counterintuitive to ask whether evolu-
tionary mechanisms can, for example, be divided into
submechanisms, or whether they can be classified hierar-
chically, into supermechanisms. It will be a future challenge
for evolutionary epistemologists to frame the questions as
well as answers in regard to how evolutionary mechanisms
relate to one another. However, these questions need to be
raised simply because several evolutionary mechanisms
exist (I return to this during the discussion of evolutionary
mechanisms).
Having proven or justified that x is a unit of evolution at
minimally one level, where it is subjected to minimally one
evolutionary mechanism sums up the identification phase
and allows us to move on to the phase of generation and
constraining of research questions.
Question-generating and constraining phase
When all the above questions are answered, or if there is
only one level where x is subjected to one evolutionary
mechanism, then one has identified x as a unit of evolution.
At this point, the heuristic goes beyond the mere identifi-
cation, mapping or categorizing of units. On the contrary, it
provides you with questions that allow you to systemati-
cally investigate how x has evolved. The heuristic is,
therefore, also a question-generating, investigative tool.
The first question that is generated is the since when
question.
Having proven that x is a unit of evolution, it becomes
necessary to ask whether x from its origin onwards has
always been a unit of evolution. This can be done by first
locating the origin of x in time, and secondly by examining
whether this date coincides with the origin of x as a unit of
evolution for each level where it is a unit. In other words,
one should consider the theoretical possibility that x has
prior existence to biological evolution, but that this x can
nevertheless become involved in the evolution of life (it
might have a prior physical or chemical existence; nucle-
otides and amino acids precede the origin of life).
The following question is: how does this unit x interact
with other units in general? More specifically, can the unit
be divided into several subunits, that are also units in
evolution in their own right? Or can this unit be absorbed
into one or more superunits, that in turn are also units of
evolution? Units are best regarded as Matruskas, structures
that are both decomposable into different substructures
and that can at the same time be grouped into larger
superstructures (genes can be divided into nucleotides,
sugar bases, and phosphates, or introns and exons, while
they can be grouped into RNA, DNA, chromosomes, etc).
In this regard, the heuristic is also a unit-detecting device.
Asking about the possibility to distinguish subunits and
superunits will expose new units of evolution that in turn
need to be investigated independently, from unit onwards.
Another query is whether the unit x can also be regarded
as either a level or a mechanism of evolution. Especially
when the unit can be divided into subunits, and when the
unit itself is thus a superunit, the latter might be a level as
well. Here too, the same criteria define levels and mecha-
nisms: if something is a level, then it means that units can
be identified as well as evolutionary mechanisms that are
active upon those units, at those levels. Mechanisms are
only mechanisms if they are active upon units at levels. If
uncertain, then the test begins from (respectively) level and
mechanism onwards.
So far, the identification of x as a unit as well as the
questions that arise from this identification, have allowed
one to generate as well as constrain specific research
avenues.
Evaluation phase
Now, it is demonstrated how the heuristic also introduces a
series of questions that allows one to evaluate the infor-
mation that is obtained by investigating x as a unit; as well
as which role this information can play in a unifying theory
on the origin and evolution of life.
More specifically, we can investigate how relevant the
unit x is or has been in evolution by asking whether the unit
is sufficient and/or necessary for life or its products to
evolve. These questions are not raised to investigate what
is ‘essential’ to evolution. Rather, they serve to evaluate the
importance of the unit. They allow us to get an overview of
the results that have been achieved by examining this unit
as well as the study that still needs to be done to solve the
problem of the evolution of life and its products. Suppose,
for example, that there exists an all-encompassing Lan-
guage Acquisition Device (module/gene, Chomsky 1965;
Fodor 1983) that is a unit of evolution. Examining this
LAD from within the above heuristic (as well as all its
subunits—if there are such subunits) will for the most part
have solved the problem of how language evolved. If on
the other hand, the human-specific shape and position of
the tongue has been demonstrated to be a unit of evolution,
then this will leave the researcher with the task of exam-
ining numerous other units, before he will try solving the
problem at hand.
If the unit x is sufficient for evolution to occur, then it
needs to be explained why there are other units involved in
evolution (if there are). It seems likely that there does not
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exist such a single unit x, but this nonetheless needs to be
proven. If it is not sufficient, then it needs to be explained
where it falls short in explaining evolution.
If the unit x is necessary for evolution, then x needs to be
treated as a general (and perhaps even universal) unit of
evolution. This means that the unit x must have been
present, at least during a specific period of time, during
life’s evolution, and, important from an epistemological
perspective, every theory that tries to explain the evolution
of life needs to take into account the evolution of this unit.
If x is not necessary for evolution to occur, then neither of
the two points are required. Rather, the unit may be
regarded as peculiar to a certain kind or aspect of evolution
(e.g. the evolution of the mind, or of language, or of
mammals), and it must thus not necessarily form part of a
general theory on the evolution of life.
The no phase
If x is not a unit of evolution, then one needs to investigate
whether x is either a mechanism or a level of evolution. If it is
either a level or a mechanism, then it needs to be treated
accordingly, from within the heuristics presented in Tables 2
and 3. If it is neither a level or a mechanism, then x should be
treated as irrelevant for evolution until proven otherwise.
How to examine whether x is a level of evolution
How do we know that x (e.g. the environment, the brain,
culture, etc.) is or is not a level of evolution (Table 2)?
The question mark phase
If we do not know whether x is a level of evolution, then
how do we begin examining x?
In such an uncertain situation, the heuristic recommends
that we try and prove that x is a level of evolution. Just as
was the case with units of evolution, it is not enough to try
and prove the no path and thus to prove that x is a unit or
mechanism, because at least units (and perhaps even evo-
lutionary mechanisms) can also be levels of evolution. An
organism can itself be unit of evolution, but it also houses
genes that are possibly units of evolution. In this regard, the
organism becomes a level where these genes can evolve.
How then do we prove that x is a level of evolution? X is
a level of evolution if one or several units of evolution can
be demonstrated to be the subject of one or several evo-
lutionary mechanisms at that level x. Identifying one or
several units of evolution that evolve at x, therefore, jus-
tifies that x is a level of evolution. The main question that is
raised in this regard is therefore, how many units can be
distinguished to evolve at level x? Every additionally
identified unit confirms that x is indeed a level.
If not even one unit of evolution can be identified to
evolve at x, then x is not a level of evolution, and one can,
therefore, immediately go to no phase.
The yes phase
The yes phase is again distinguishable as an identification,
question-constraining and generating, and an evaluation
phase.
Identification phase
If one immediately chose the yes scenario, then this action
can be justified if one or several units of evolution can be
identified to evolve at this level. If the latter is indeed the
case, then the goal is to identify all units that are the
subject of evolution at this level. Every additional unit that
is recognized to evolve at this level warrants the claim that
x is a level.
If multiple units are indeed identified, then it also needs
to be specified how these units interact or relate to one
another, specifically in regard to this level.
At this point, a testing device is built into the heuristic,
by asking how many evolutionary mechanisms are active at
this level, not on this level.
Especially the latter point is important. It would be
illegitimate to recursively ask the same questions raised
regarding the study of units of evolution and simply replace
the word ‘unit’ with the word ‘level’. That is, it would be
wrong to ask ‘How did/does this level evolve? Identify the
evolutionary mechanisms by which the level evolved in
regard to (for) this unit’.
This question is illegitimate because the existence of the
level does not depend on the existence of the unit. The
level did not evolve in regard to or for the unit. This would
be teleological. The environment, for example, did not
evolve for the phenotype,4 or culture did not evolve for
pointing to occur.
What does make sense is to ask like this: since when did
this level become a level in the evolution of the unit? Since
when is a unit subjected to an evolutionary mechanism at
this level? But this brings us to the since when question,
and so the above question between brackets becomes
unnecessary.
What also makes sense is to ask how the level itself
evolved. However, if it evolved—which in turn means that
it is subjected to one or several evolutionary mechanism(s)
at certain level(s)—then one needs to treat the level as a
4 The environment evolves differently because of the emergence of
the phenotype (as, e.g. demonstrated by niche construction, Lewontin
2000), but it did not evolve ‘for’ the phenotype before the latter was
present.
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possible unit of evolution and thus start from unit onwards.
Here too, the above question between brackets thus
becomes unnecessary.
It is, therefore, only intelligible to ask how many evo-
lutionary mechanisms are active at this level (rather than
on this level). This question in turn equals the question:
how many evolutionary mechanisms are active upon the
units that evolve at this level. The identification of evolu-
tionary mechanisms that are active at this level thus
depends upon the units that are the subject of evolution at
this level. These units should in principal have been
identified during the previous step of the heuristic. And the
evolutionary mechanisms that are active upon these units
should in principle already be known.
By and large, the identification of the evolutionary
mechanisms that are active at this level x on one or more
units, is thus a test that allows to confirm the results that
were obtained by following the rules set forth by the pre-
vious step of the heuristic. The recognition of one mech-
anism that is active at this level on a unit again confirms
and even justifies that x is a level. But again, it is advised to
independently expose all evolutionary mechanisms that are
active at this level. (A simple count of the mechanisms that
are active at the level can also provide insight into the
nature of the level.)
If multiple mechanisms are indeed identified to be
active, then a further question that needs to be asked is how
these evolutionary mechanisms interact or relate to one
another regarding this level in particular. How does the
ratchet effect for example interact with the Baldwin effect
at the cultural level in regard to the different units that are
exposed to these mechanisms?
Question-generating and constraining phase
Once x has been identified as a level, the heuristic again
generates new and specific research questions, as was the
case with the identification of x as a unit.
Specific to the level heuristic is that it asks the following
question: what is the ontological status of the level. If
something is a unit of evolution, then it exists, otherwise it
cannot be the target of a certain evolutionary mechanism.
Genes, for example are, under certain circumstances, units
of natural selection. The concept of a gene however is a
theoretical, abstract notion (Stadler et al. 2009). That is,
when a certain group of molecules (nucleotides, phos-
phates, sugar molecules, etc.) is structured in a certain
manner, it is called a gene. When it is said that a gene is the
target of selection, one actually argues that it is this whole
group of molecules that is subjected to selection. The term
‘gene’ is just an abbreviation for this group of molecules, a
handy concept that does not make it necessary to sum up
all the different elements that make up a gene. But even
though the gene is an abstract notion, the things it denotes
are actual, existing entities.
Contrary to units, the ontological status of levels is not
always clairvoyant. Assuming for example that culture or the
community are levels of evolution (an assumption that still
needs to be justified), the ontological status of these levels is
uncertain. Does culture exist independently from the indi-
viduals that lie at its emergence (does it form a superorganic
structure that has existence prior to and outside individuals as
e.g. Kroeber 1923 thought); or is ‘culture’ merely an abstract
notion that is introduced to facilitate theory formation
(e.g. Sapir 1917)? Does there exist a ‘language community’
(Chomsky 1965; de Saussure 1972; Wittgenstein 1953)
without individual language-bearing organisms?
Thus, it becomes necessary to identify the ontological
status of the level, whether it is an abstract notion that
facilitates theory formation, or whether it is an existing
entity in the world.
The question that asks about the ontological status of the
level needs to be raised to be able to answer the questions
raised by the next step in the heuristic, namely the since
when-step.
Having demonstrated that x is a level of evolution, it
becomes necessary to investigate since when x is a level of
evolution.
More specifically, if x is an existing entity, then it can
have an existence prior to it being a level of the evolution
of life and its products. If it is indeed an existing entity,
then the origin of x, therefore, needs to be examined
independently, as well as when exactly x became a level of
life’s evolution, or one of life’s products, for each unit
where it serves as a level. Earth for example exists from
4.5 billion years ago, but only becomes a level in the
evolution of life from 3.85 billion years ago—which is the
estimated time that life first arose on earth. And homo-
logues of Broca’s region already exist in the monkey brain
(the F5 region, Fadiga et al. 2000), but it is unclear when
they became a level of language evolution.
If x is not an existing entity, then it needs to be dem-
onstrated when it becomes necessary to invoke x as an
abstract notion in the theory on evolution; as well as when
it becomes necessary to invoke x as an abstract notion for
each unit where it serves as a level.
When x first became a level of evolution (abstract or
real) depends on the age of the unit(s) that is/are identified
to be subjected to (an) evolutionary mechanism(s) at that
level. The age of the oldest unit that evolves/(d) at that
level equals the age that x became a level of evolution. In
order to determine this date, it needs to be dated when each
unit that evolves at this level, became a unit of evolution at
that level.
Similar to the unit heuristic, the following steps of this
heuristic allows one to examine how this level interacts
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with other levels. Moreover, as was the case with the units
of evolution, it is interesting to ask whether this level can
be divided into sub- or superlevels of evolution. The level
of the environment might be absorbed into large categories
such as ‘the physical world’ or subdivided into different
landscapes, niches, etc. The community level might for
example be absorbed into the cultural level or divided into
the family level, the peer level, the educational level, etc. If
there are indeed such sub-or superlevels, then these levels
need to be studied in their own right from levels of evo-
lution onwards. In this regard the heuristic is also a level-
detecting device.
Not only is it interesting to try and identify other levels
by studying this level x in particular, one also needs to try
and identify the level under examination as a possible unit
or a mechanism of evolution.
That the level x is also a unit of evolution depends on
whether it is itself subjected to evolutionary mechanisms
that are involved in evolution at certain (other) levels of
evolution. (The ontological status of the level might pro-
vide a possible break-in to such investigation.) If this is
indeed the case, then the level should be treated as a unit
from unit onwards. In this regard again, the heuristic can be
a unit-detecting device. It can also be a mechanism-
detecting device. In order to investigate whether a level is
also a mechanism, the level x must be demonstrated to
work on units at other levels (see also the discussion of
mechanisms later in the text).
Evaluation phase
If x is indeed a level of evolution, then the final step of the
heuristic again entails specifying how relevant the level is
or has been, in the evolution of life. Again this is not
required so that one can detect what is essential to evolu-
tion. Rather, this will help evaluate the importance of the
results obtained when studying this level x, and it will shed
light upon what still needs to be dealt with in the future if
one wants to unravel the evolution of life.
The relevance of the level can be deliberated by speci-
fying whether x as a level is sufficient or necessary for
evolution, or both.
If x as a level (e.g. the environment) is indeed sufficient
for life to evolve, then it should be explained why other
levels (e.g. species) are involved in the evolution of life
(if indeed there are). If it is not sufficient, then it should be
explained where it falls short.
If x as a level is necessary for evolution to occur, then x
should be treated as a general (universal) level of evolution
that needs to be present during a certain time in evolution.
In this scenario, x should also be accounted for in all the-
ories that deal with the evolution of life.
If it is not necessary, then x can be treated as a pecu-
liarity that neither necessarily is present during a certain
time in evolution, nor need it necessarily be part of a theory
that deals with the evolution of life or aspects thereof.
The no phase
If x is not a level of evolution, then one needs to investigate
whether it is a unit or mechanism in evolution. If neither of
the latter can be proven, then x can be treated as irrelevant
for the evolution of life, until proven otherwise.
How to examine whether x is an evolutionary mechanism
involved in evolution
If we have an x (e.g. natural selection, symbiogenesis, drift,
the ratchet effect, the Baldwin effect, niche construction,
etc.) of which we do not know whether it is an evolutionary
mechanism or not, then how do we begin examining
whether this x is an evolutionary mechanism?
The question mark phase
If we are not sure, then we need to try and prove that it is
indeed an evolutionary mechanism and thus to go to the yes
phase. One can proof that x is a evolutionary mechanism by
identifying at least one unit upon which the presumed
evolutionary mechanism x is active. If not one unit of
evolution is found to be subjected to x, then the latter is not
an evolutionary mechanism.
If one or several such units are indeed identified upon
which x is active, then it is justified to call x an evolu-
tionary mechanism.
The yes phase
Again, the yes phase in distinguishable into an identifica-
tion, question constraining and generating, and an evalua-
tion phase.
Identification phase
If one immediately went to the yes-phase of the heuristic,
then this action can only be justified if at least one unit of
evolution can be identified that is subjected to this evolu-
tionary mechanism.
At this stage, again all units upon which the mechanism
is active need to be identified; thus, the how many-question
prevails again.
If amongst the identified units that are subjected to this
evolutionary mechanism are newly identified evolution
units, then the latter need to be investigated separately,
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from unit onwards. Once more, the heuristic can, therefore,
identify new units of evolution.
If multiple units have indeed been identified, then it also
needs to be examined how these units interact or relate to
one another, specifically in regard to this evolutionary
mechanism.
Next step is to identify at (not on) how many levels of
evolution this mechanism is active. This question equals
the question at how many levels the identified units of
evolution are subjected to this evolutionary mechanism.
Thus, in principle, the levels are already identified during
the study of the units. Nonetheless, the heuristic advises to
sum up the levels independently. This allows to have an
independent notion of the amount of levels at which the
mechanism is active and it enables one to again test the
previous step. One or more levels again confirm that it is
justified to identify x as an mechanism.
If multiple levels are identified, then it needs to be
examined how these different levels interact or relate to
one another, specifically in regard to this mechanism.
Question-generating and constraining phase
Having identified x as an evolutionary mechanism, the
heuristic again offers questions that allow for a more sys-
tematic examination of the mechanism.
The following question is specific to the examination of
evolutionary mechanisms: How does the mechanism work?
More specifically, which conditions need to be met for the
evolutionary mechanism to occur?
Evolutionary mechanisms are not constant forces that
are always present. Rather, they only occur when certain
conditions are met. These conditions are constant5 and
always need to be met, before an evolutionary mechanism
becomes active.
The answer to the question, which conditions need to be
met, will again be of an evolutionary epistemological
nature. More specifically, the answer will involve one or
more universal formulas that are abstracted from the evo-
lutionary mechanism that explains the workings of the
mechanism. The evolutionary epistemological formulas
have presently only been abstracted from two evolutionary
mechanisms: natural selection (e.g. Campbell’s 1974 ‘blind
variation and selective retention’, Plotkin’ 1994 ‘generate,
test, regenerate’ formula) and symbiogenesis (Gontier
2007). As is well known in the evolutionary epistemolog-
ical community, such formulas are themselves heuristics
that inform us upon the workings of the mechanisms.
These formulas will also explain equivalent questions
such as ‘How is it possible that the same evolutionary
mechanism is active on one or different units, at the same
or different levels?’ According to Campbell (1997), natural
selection, for example, can be active upon one or multiple
units at the same or different levels, as long as all these
units vary blindly, and as long as all these levels allow for
the selective retention of these units.
It will be a challenge for the future to abstract universal
formulas from all other known evolutionary mechanisms.
Such abstractions or ‘logical skeletons’ (Lewontin 1970) that
allow to identify the conditions that need to be met for a
certain evolutionary mechanism to become active are highly
necessary for future theory formation (Gontier 2008).
In evolution studies, these conditions need to be speci-
fied to be able to answer the following question of the
heuristic: Since when did x become a mechanism involved
in the evolution of life, for the units it is active upon and
the levels it is active at.
This question can be answered as soon as one can date
when the mechanism became active upon each unit and at
each level of evolution where it is known to be active. But
how do we know when did it become active upon these
units and at these levels?
We can investigate when the mechanism became
involved in evolution on a certain unit by examining when
the conditions are met regarding this unit (e.g. in the case
of natural selection, when a unit became a replicator or
interactor).
We can investigate when the mechanism became
involved in evolution at a certain level of evolution by
examining when the conditions are met regarding this level
of evolution (e.g. in the case of natural selection, when a
level of evolution achieved the ability to selectively retain
replicators). The latter, therefore, is again dependable on
the units that evolve at this level.
The next step that the heuristic entails is in asking how the
mechanism x interacts with other mechanisms that are
known to be involved in the evolution of life. This is evi-
dently done by comparing the mechanism x with all other
mechanisms that are known to be involved in evolution.
Although perhaps counterintuitive, the mere existence of
different mechanisms makes it at least theoretically possible
that these mechanisms interact in one form or another, by, for
example, competing or being cooperatively or complemen-
tarily active upon certain units. These theoretical possibili-
ties need to be demonstrated to exist, or it needs to be
explained why they cannot occur in real life. Nonetheless,
they need to be the subject of future investigation.
Again it also becomes interesting to ask whether the
mechanism can be divided into submechanisms or super-
mechanisms. If so, then these sub- and supermechanisms
need to be studied from mechanism onwards, and it needs
5 Which does not necessarily imply that the mechanism itself is
constantly active. However, when it is active, the same conditions
must be present.
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to be investigated whether they are also involved in evo-
lution in their own right.
That submechanisms exist depends upon the existence
of subconditions that can be regarded as single, indepen-
dent mechanisms (e.g. is the ratchet effect or the Baldwin
effect a submechanism of natural selection or a mechanism
in its own right?). The existence of supermechanisms will
depend on the existence of mechanisms that allow to
combine different mechanisms in a yet to be defined
manner (perhaps hierarchically).
The discussion of sub- and supermechanisms is also
strange if not counterintuitive. However, given that the
evolutionary epistemological formulas (itself heuristics) of
most evolutionary mechanisms still need to be abstracted,
the possibility of such sub- and supermechanisms cannot be
excluded a priori.
Next, the heuristic advises us to investigate whether the
mechanism can also be regarded either as a unit or a level
of evolution. Thus, once more, the heuristic generates as
well as constrains research questions. The former would
entail that the mechanism is itself subjected to at least one
evolutionary mechanism at, at least, one level of evolution.
The latter would entail that at least one unit of evolution
can be demonstrated to evolve according to an identified
evolutionary mechanism at this mechanism x, or that an
evolutionary mechanism is active upon a unit of evolution
at this mechanism.
It is currently unknown how mechanisms can them-
selves be the subject of evolution (as units), or how they
can be levels where (certain types of) evolution occurs.
Although a theoretical consideration that cannot a priori be
proven to be wrong (for it depends on the nature of the
evolutionary mechanisms), the validity of the above two
questions remains to be proven.
Evaluation phase
Finally, here too an evaluation phase is built into the heu-
ristic to enable one to investigate the importance and rele-
vance of the mechanism in the evolution of life as well as the
role it needs to play in the theorizing on life’s evolution and
its products. This will again allow for an evaluation of the
results obtained when studying this mechanism. Supposing,
for example, that x is a mechanism that is identified to be
active on all known units, at all known levels, the mecha-
nism will for a great deal have solved the puzzle of how life
evolved.
The relevance is tested by examining whether the evo-
lutionary mechanism x is sufficient for evolution to occur
or not, and whether it is necessary for evolution to occur or
not.
If sufficient, then it needs to be explained why other
mechanisms are involved in the evolution of life (if there
are). If necessary, then x needs to be treated as an evolu-
tionary mechanism that needs to be active at some point
during evolution and that, therefore, needs to be accounted
for in all theories on the evolution of life.
If unnecessary, then the evolutionary mechanism can be
treated as a peculiar/particular mechanism that does not
need to be active during life’s evolution and that does not
necessarily need to be accounted for in all theories on the
evolution of life (the inference of the mechanism x in a
theory will depend on which aspects of evolution are
highlighted in that theory).
The no phase
If x is not an evolutionary mechanism, then it needs to be
investigated whether it is either a unit or a level of evo-
lution. If neither, then x is irrelevant for the evolution of
life until proven otherwise (depending on incoming data).
Conclusions and future research
The original goal of evolutionary epistemology was to
study cognition like any other biological phenomenon, but
the field has come a long way ever since. Together with
biologists that were interested in the units and levels of
selection, evolutionary epistemology has set the stage for
the implementation of evolutionary, selectionist thinking in
many different scientific domains, ranging from neural
Darwinism to memetics, immunology, economics, devel-
opmental systems theory and so on (Cziko 1995).
This wide application has allowed us to currently
identify a new series of problems, unforeseen by the ori-
ginal thinkers that applied their insights only to the evo-
lution of the phenotype and cognition. More specifically,
when studying physical traits, a (set of) genes, a (set of)
behaviours, developmental systems, cultural units, arte-
facts, neural maps, cognitive traits, altruistic rules etc., it is
not always clear what kind of units they are (interactors,
replicators or reproducers) of what kinds of evolution, and
at what levels they evolve—whether indeed they are ele-
ments of evolution, and even if we were to identify them as
either one, it still then does not guaranty us that it will help
us solve the problem of how these units actually evolved,
according to which mechanisms and at what levels.
Moreover, complex phenomena like the evolution of
culture or language seem to involve a multiplicity of units
(e.g. the supralaryngeal vocal tract, Broca and Wernicke’s
area, social behaviour), levels (the cultural level, biological
level, genetic level) and mechanisms (natural selection, the
Baldwin and ratchet effect).
Coming to terms with evolution as something that
always occurs, realizing that there can be different kinds of
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evolution (the evolution of life, culture, the brain), as well
as the recognition of a multiplicity of units, levels and
mechanisms made us realize that we now need to start an
active search for the different kinds of evolution as well as
the units, levels and mechanisms in their own right. The
time is now ripe to move beyond the metaphysical, on
natural selection-based and biased views of what the units
and levels are or ought to be that do the evolving. Besides
unit and level pluralism, also mechanism pluralism must be
endorsed.
Evolutionary epistemology can be the method that
allows us to start this active search for units, levels and
mechanism of evolution. Rather than search for intrinsic
properties of units, levels and evolutionary mechanisms,
here a pragmatic approach is favoured. X is a unit if it
evolves at a level according to a certain mechanism; x is a
level if certain units evolve at x because they are subjected
to certain mechanisms; x is a mechanism if it is active upon
certain units at certain levels. Not one step in the heuristic
is taken for granted—not even the units, levels or evolu-
tionary mechanisms, since the existence of any one of them
depends upon the existence of the other two.
The heuristics set forward in this article are not merely
devices that categorize the current data on evolution.
Rather, these are the genuine search engines that allow
identifying the different units, levels and mechanisms of
evolution. The heuristics furthermore systematize, gener-
ate, constrain and allow one to evaluate different research
avenues.
The above listed heuristics also makes us realize that an
incredible amount of work needs to be done if we are ever
to develop a unified theory of evolution. Indeed, this is a
work that can succeed only if scholars unite. Databases
need to be built, which group the identified units, levels,
mechanisms and kinds of evolution. Moreover, logical
skeletons need to be built, which list the conditions that
need to be fulfilled for an evolutionary mechanism to be
active.
It is amazing how simple the different questions can be
framed, and how difficult it is to provide an answer to
every single one of them. It, therefore, needs to be stressed
that every single question that is raised by the heuristic
regarding a certain x that might be involved in evolution,
involves a research project on its own. Nonetheless, all
these different research routes can be brought together into
one all encompassing research plan. At the onset, the focus
should lie at subunits, sublevels and submechanisms and
the more knowledge we have of these, the more we can
build ‘the big picture’ by investigating superunits, super-
levels and supermechanisms and their relations.
The above heuristic presents a methodology that will
allow us to firmly ground, test as well as identify the units,
levels and mechanisms of evolution. EE will systematize,
synthesize and further analyse the current theories and
debates into a unifying science of evolution.
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